evolution are; the latter being, so to say, categories of the second degree.'

He then concludes with some suggestions of the reality of supra-personal entelechies manifested in supra-personal unities and wholeness, more especially in organic evolution, in human history, and in human morals: ' More than anything else, it seems to me, the *existence of a moral consciousness in man* gives us a sign of supra-personal unity, . . . Conscience seems to be the means by which the supra-personal agent guides the will.'

Finally, he inquires : Is not a monistic view, after all, possible ? He cannot absolutely rule it out, but regards it as a prejudice resulting from the ill-founded Spinozian dogma that it is necessary to regard absolute Reality as something that is throughout spatially symbolized in our experience. ' Personally, I confess that, while a monism of order . . . is not altogether impossible—though even then it is not quite satisfactory—I myself feel forced to accept the dualistic doctrine inspiteof all logical postulates. This dualism, then, might be summed up as follows. There is the material world as the world of chance, but there is also a world of form and order that manifests itself in certain areas of the material world, namely, in the biological individual, and probably, in another way, in phylogeny and history also ; there *may* even be form-like constellations in what we call the Inorganic.'

In spite of Driesch's reluctance to ascribe psychical or mental functions to his entelechies, it is obvious that the role he assigns to them in morphogenesis and in

regulation of bodily processes in general, as well as in instinctive activities, implies two of the most distinctive attributes of mind—namely, memory and the intelligent bringing to bear of memory in the direction of present